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COMMITMENT TO FARVIEW: INCOMPETENCY
TO STAND TRIAL IN PENNSYLVANIA
I. ANTITHERAPEUTIC VALUE OF FARVIEW
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has maintained Farview
State Hospital as an institution devoted exclusively to the care of
patients afflicted with mental problems who either endanger the security
of other state hospitals or stand charged or convicted of a crime.: How-
ever, there are several factors which prevent the Farview staff from
providing effective or adequate care for patients committed there.
First, Farview is hopelessly overcrowded and understaffed. Although
the optimum population is 999, Farview as of February 7, 1969, housed
1,167 patients.' These patients received care from a staff comprising
one accredited psychiatrist, six physicians, five psychologists, five
Registered Nurses, twelve licensed Practical Nurses, two social workers
with Masters degrees, one case worker with a Bachelors degree, one
who has no degree, and one recreational therapist, but no occupational
therapists who have met the state civil service requirements. 3 Located
in a remote and sparsely populated area of Pennsylvania about 200 miles
from Philadelphia and paying sub-standard state salaries, it has diffi-
culty in attracting enough competent professionals to its staff. Limited
in resources, it can provide no more than "milieu" ' and drug therapy
for most of its patients. Individual psychotherapy is virtually non-
existent (25 of 1,167 patients are in treatment at a time), and
only 35 patients are currently in group therapy.'
The inability of Farview's staff to provide adequate care adversely
affects many persons committed there. The following condemnation
of Michigan's Ionia State Hospital is an apt description of analogous
treatment given at Farview.
Many of the patients at Ionia State Hospital do not
consider it a hospital but rather a prison and, in fact, an ex-
' Mental Health Act of 1951, § 1230(b) ; No. 444, [1963] Pa. Laws 976-77, amend-
ing No. 581, [1952] Pa. Laws 2059 (repealed effective July 1, 1969). For an extensive
description of Farview State Hospital, see Note, Hospitalization of Mentally Il
Criminals in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 78 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Hospitalization of Mentally Ill Criminals].
2 Interview with John Moran, Director of Social Services at Farview, Feb. 7, 1969.
a Id. Letter from Dr. Bernard J. Willis, Clinical Director at Farview, to Bert
Hoff, Apr. 2, 1969, on file at Biddle Law Library at the University of Pennsylvania.
4 "Milieu" therapy is the imposition of a structured and ordered environment on a
patient who is unable to provide the internal structure which enables "normal" people
to live in a complex society and environment. See, Note, Hospitalization of Mentally
Ill Criminals, supra note 1, at 86.
5 It is difficult to persuade many more patients than this to participate in the
group therapy program. Interview with John Moran, supra note 2.
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tremely undesirable prison. For the majority, it is a prison
to which one is committed on an arbitrary and incompre-
hensible basis; it is a prison in which apparent medical func-
tions are carried on in a mechanical fashion without reference
to any previous or future framework; it is a prison in which
hopes of release gradually are transformed into despair and
finally into psychotic delusions. The Ionia atmosphere is pre-
dominantly composed of feelings of uncertainty and insecurity.
Such feelings have their origin in, and are reinforced by, the
uncertainty of the statute, the uncertainty in the mind of the
court, and the uncertainty in the minds of the examining
physicians. Uncertainty continues at the hospital in the minds
of the patient and the doctors.
What of the patient? How does he react to the un-
certainty and the endless drifting to which he is subjected?
The answer is simple: he becomes sicker. The records
studied at Ionia are replete with examples of patients who
in the initial stages of their hospitalization made significant
improvement. However, because such improvement was not
measured against any therapeutic framework or applied to
any definite goal other than vague concepts of social com-
petency or "restoration to sanity," it passed almost unnoticed.
At such a time the patient is struck by the realization that his
chances of release are remote. His already sick and flimsy
personality structure collapses and the frightening hostility
and desolating worthlessness against which the patient has
struggled are intensified. Possibilities of mental health be-
come more remote. Questions of parole or discharge become
academic. The picture of the gradually decreasing frequency
of the doctors' visits and the less frequent staff interviews
looms large. Concepts of incurability are considered by both
patient and hospital staff. Many human beings are lost, not
a dozen or fifty, but literally hundreds, to themselves and to
society."
The Pennsylvania courts, then, when deciding whether to commit a
person to Farview, must consider the depressing reality that Farview
offers: that is, a likely reversal in a patient's progress toward mental
health.
In addition to this undesirable aspect, the courts must also face
the probability that persons committed to Farview are likely to remain
incarcerated for a period in excess of any penal sanctions the state
could impose. This situation becomes extremely poignant when the
0 Comment, Competency to Stand Trial, 59 MIcH. L. REv. 1078, 1091-92 (1961) ;
cf. Hess & Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results and Problems,
119 Am. J. PsYcHr. 713 (1962).
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court commits a person awaiting trial as incompetent to stand trial.
Virtually all persons found incompetent to stand trial are committed to
Farview or to a maximum security or criminal ward of a state hospital
until competent or restored to sanity.- Of the 1,167 patients at Farview,
518 were committed under criminal charges prior to trial. The records
of the Director of Farview indicate that as of October 13, 1968,
53 persons from Philadelphia were at Farview, "awaiting trial, sen-
tence, or other judicial disposition by the Philadelphia County Court." 8
Of these, the status of one is unclear, and 4 appeared at Farview
substantially after the charges on which they await trial were brought.'
The remaining 48 appear to have been sent directly to Farview to
be held as incompetent to stand trial. In addition, the Prison Re-
search Council of the University of Pennsylvania Law School has
questionnaires from 2 persons from Philadelphia County, being held
at Farview as incompetent, whose names do not appear on the director's
records. Of the 48 patients from Philadelphia sent directly to Farview
and on the director's records as awaiting trial, 16 have been incarcerated
longer than they would have been had maximum sentence been im-
posed and cumulated on a finding of guilty on all indictments with
which they were charged. The following table gives an indication of
the longevity of detention.
TABLE I
Number of persons A incarcerated 2 times maximum
cumulative sentences ..................... 14
Number of persons A incarcerated 3 times maximum
cumulative sentences ..................... 12
Number of persons A incarcerated 4 times maximum
cumulative sentences ..................... 9
Number of persons A incarcerated 5 times maximum
cumulative sentences ..................... 9
Number of persons A incarcerated 6 times maximum
cumulative sentences ..................... 4
Total ......................... 48
A These figures do not include one patient incarcerated 21 years on a "surety of the
peace." Nor do they include 14 persons charged with murder, who may receive
a life or a death sentence should they go to trial.10
7A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 38 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
GOLDSTEIN] ; Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARv. L. ,zEv. 454, 455 (1967).
3 Letter from Dr. Shovlin, Director of Farview, to Arlen Specter, District
Attorney of Philadelphia, Oct. 13, 1968.
9 These defendants were probably committed elsewhere and administratively
transferred to Farview.
-10 The 14 accused of murder have been at Farview an average of 13.3 years. The
3 longest terms of incarceration are 39 years and 9 months, 38 years and 3 months,
and 25 years and 2 months. There is no way of telling how many of the 14 would
have been found guilty of a lesser charge, found not guilty by reason of insanity,
or otherwise acquitted.
Furthermore, were maximum concurrent sentences imposed on all
outstanding charges, 19 prisoners would receive sentences shorter
than the length of time they already have been incarcerated.
A few case histories will adequately demonstrate the hopeless
plight of some Farview patients committed as incompetent to stand
trial. A man indicted for robbery (which has a maximum sentence of
10 years "1) was sent to Farview in 1936. There he remains, ostensibly
waiting to go to trial. A fellow patient, accused of assault and battery,
was sent to Farview about 193/ years ago, while the maximum term of
imprisonment for assault and battery is only 2 years.-2  A shoplifter
who struggled with police after being apprehended was sent to Farview
in 1951. Although the maximum terms of imprisonment for shop-
lifting and resisting arrest are 90 days .3 and one year 14 respectively,
this patient is still being detained. Another man, charged with assault
and battery with intent to kill, which carries a maximum penalty of
7 years,' has been at Farview for almost 19 years.
If a patient received adequate and effective treatment at Farview,
this type of extended incarceration might be justified. But the
penal atmosphere of Farview tends to hinder recovery. 6 Many
prisoners at Farview view their incarceration with jaundiced eyes.'
7
The state has formally accused them of a crime, yet refused to bring
them to trial in an open court and permit them to assert their defenses.
When they enter Farview, they come into contact with persons who
have been incarcerated there for thirty years. They soon realize that
almost as many people leave Farview in a pine box as are formally
discharged.' 8 They begin to feel that the state will keep them secreted
at Farview, far away from their homes and friends, for the rest of their
lives. They also realize that little or no treatment is available. Finally,
insult is added to injury. Sections 501 and 502 of the Mental Health &
Mental Retardation Act of 19661 impose liability upon them and those
who have a legal duty of support for costs they incur.
It is no wonder, then, that the hospital is seen by many psychotic
paranoids as the chief instrument in a governmental conspiracy against
"
1
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4704 (1963).
12 Id. § 4708.
33Id. §4816.1 (Supp. 1969).
14d. § 4314.
11 Id. §4710 (1963).
16 Note 37 infra & accompanying text.
17 These views of Farview were expressed by prisoners in letters written to the
Prison Research Council, University of Pennsylvania Law School, on file at the
Prison Research Council.
The debilitating aspects of hospitalization are described graphically in Hess &
Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 6.
18 Appendix B in Note, Hospitalization of Mentally Ill Crintinals, supra note 1,
indicates that between 1945 and 1960, 719 patients were released from Farview while
510 died there.
19 PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4501-02 (Supp. 1969).
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them. In this situation, treatment in any meaningful sense is im-
possible. When a patient has only been charged with a crime and has
not been proven dangerous to society or himself, the wisdom of com-
mitting him to an institution of a penal nature, which may further
impair his mental abilities, is certainly open to question. Bearing in
mind the illusory therapeutic value of Farview, this Comment will
discuss the purposes of commitment for incompetency and analyze the
Pennsylvania laws governing it.
II. STANDARDS FOP COMMITMENT
The common law standard for competence to stand trial is whether
the accused can comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him
and assist his attorney in making a rational defense."° However, in
Pennsylvania the matter has not been that simple. The standard of
competency has undergone a convoluted development.
In Commonwealth v. Moon," the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
faced the question whether Pennsylvania's "Mental Health Act of 1951
changed the common law test for staying criminal proceedings after
the verdict but prior to sentence or execution." ' After Moon had
been found guilty of first degree murder, sentenced to death, and im-
prisoned in the Warren County Jail, the county sheriff petitioned the
trial court to appoint a sanity commission under section 344 of the
Mental Health Act of 1951.' The commission found that Moon was
mentally ill and suffered from "dementia praecox of the paranoid
type" 4 but that he understood the nature and meaning of his trial and
sentence. The trial court found that since Moon understood the nature
of his trial and could assist his attorneys, he was legally sane.
The supreme court reversed on the ground that the trial court
erred by applying the common law standard of competency. Section 344
provided for a petition for commitment of any person "[d]etained in
any penal or correctional institution who is thought to be mentally ill
or in such condition that he requires care in a mental hospital. . . ."
Under section 345 of the Act of 1951, the trial court was to commit
the person if the court was satisfied that he was mentally ill. The Act
in section 102(11)2 defined mental illness as "an illness which so
20 Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 23, 117 A.2d 96, 99 (1955).
21383 Pa. 18, 117 A2d 96 (1955).
2 2 Id. at 20, 117 A.2d at 98.
23 No. 581, [1952] Pa. Laws 2065, amending No. 141, [1951] Pa. Laws 555-56
(repealed effective July 1, 1969).
4 383 Pa. at 21, 117 A.2d at 98.
25 No. 581, [1952] Pa. Laws 2065, amending No. 141, [1951] Pa. Laws 555-56
(repealed effective July 1, 1969).
2 6 No. 581, [1952] Pa. Laws 2055, amending No. 141, [1951] Pa. Laws 539
(repealed effective July 1, 1969).
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lessens the capacity of a person to use his customary self-control, judg-
ment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as
to make it necessary or advisable for him to be under care." 27
Since the trial court had applied the common law standard of com-
petency, rather than the statutory standard of mental illness, the
supreme court remanded the case to allow the trial court to determine
whether Moon's mental illness so lessened his mental capacities as to
render commitment necessary or advisable, with the final decision rest-
ing exclusively in the court.
The Moon standard of mental illness was not limited to that
case's narrow factual setting, which involved an alleged incompetent
awaiting execution for murder2 Section 344 of the Act of 1951
expressly applied to persons detained in any penal institution and not
simply to convicted murderers. Consequently, the Moon standard of
competency was applicable to all persons detained in a penal institution
who were being considered for commitment as incompetent to stand
trial.
The class of mentally ill persons for whom commitment is ad-
visable or necessary, and who may be committed under the terms of the
Mental Health Act of 1951, is much larger than the class of persons who
are so out of touch with reality that they cannot understand the nature
of the proceedings against them and assist their attorneys, and who
could therefore be committed under the common law standard. The
two groups are not to be taken as congruent, by any means. 9 A para-
noid schizophrenic who was "commanded by God" to murder someone
in order to thwart a massive government conspiracy, or whose crime
otherwise arises out of his delusional system, will so confuse reality with
fantasy as to be unable to advise his attorney about the facts of the
crime. However, even a person who believes God directed him to kill
someone, who feels he is the victim of a massive conspiracy, or for some
other reason is unable to tell his attorney why he committed the crime,
may be able to tell the lawyer how and when he did it, and thus may not
be committed under the common law standard."0 But mental illness is
much more subtle. There are many psychotics who function quite nor-
mally over a broad spectrum of human affairs. Most psychotics would
27 Id.
28 Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 218 A2d 758, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 869 (1966).
29 See AERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 360
(1961) ; Carroll & Leopold, The Current Influence of Psychiatric Concepts in Deter-
mining Criminal Responsibility in Pennsylvania, 31 TEMP. L.Q. 254 (1958); Note,
Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 7, at 459.
20 A patient observed by the author at a staff presentation at Norristown State
Hospital believed that God commanded him to stab his landlady and commit suicide
in order to thwart a Communist-Nazi conspiracy to overthrow the government. He
was able to relate the events which transpired at the time of the crime with a great
degree of lucidity. There was no doubt that he was extremely ill, yet he was able
to stand trial and conducted an adequate defense.
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be able to relate the facts of their case, assist their attorneys in their
defense, and make rational strategic decisions during their trial."
This change in the statutory standard of competency to stand
trial, which was substantially similar to the standard for civil commit-
ment,"2 was hailed in some quarters as an enlightened change per-
mitting proper inquiry into the real issue in incompetency proceedings-
whether the accused should be committed at this time." Such a rule
would enable more people to be placed in the rehabilitative, rather than
the penal, system than the narrower M'Naghton 4 "knowledge of right
and wrong" test would have allowed.35 However, the effect of liberaliz-
ing the standard of commitment on persons charged with a crime and
then committed as incompetent to stand trial was less than beneficial in
Pennsylvania." Farview is able to offer little or no treatment. The
isolation of a defendant in a remote area of Pennsylvania for a pro-
tracted period has the immensely antitherapeutic effect of dissolving ties
with family and friends in his home town. Furthermore, treatment is
much more difficult when the charges are still outstanding than in the
case where the patient is tried as soon as possible and treatment begun
after sentencing or acquittal." A fundamental problem in any psychosis
31 In the summer of 1968 the author participated in a 2 month clinical training
program in psychiatry. One day a pleasant, vivacious, intelligent, apparently normal
woman of about 40 was interviewed. After 15 minutes of amiable conversation, she
commented that she was afraid to use the bathroom facilities in the ward because she
felt her karma (life-force which determines destiny in one's next existence) was in the
plumbing and would be forever lost. It is doubtful whether her grandiose delusional
system or failure in reality-testing in this limited sphere would interfere with her
competency to stand trial, were she accused of a crime.
32See No. 648, [1961] Pa. Laws 1529, amending No. 581, [1952] Pa. Laws 2063
(repealed effective July 1, 1969).
33H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRImINAL DEFENSE 428 (1954);
Borden, Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill in Pennsylvania, 33 TEMP. L.Q. 165, 167, 195
(1960); Slough & Wilson, Mental Capacity to Stand Trial, 21 U. Pitt. L. REv. 593,
597-98 (1960).
34 M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
35 See Slough & Wilson, Mental Capacity to Stand Trial, suipra note 33; 29
TEMP. L.Q. 389, 391 (1956) ; cf. Borden, Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill in Pennsylvania,
supra note 33, at 200-01.
3 6 See AmERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 29, at 359-60; GoLDSTEIN, supra
note 7, at 185-220; Vann, Pretrial Determination and Judicial Decision-Making: An
Analysis of the Use of Psychiatric Information in the Administration of Criminal
Justice, 43 U. DET. L.J. 13, 32 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Vann] ; Note, Incompetency
to Stand Trial, supra note 7, at 459-61. See also Morris, Psychiatry and the Danger-
ous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 514, 522 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Morris].
37 Interviews with Dr. Edward B. Guy of the Maximum Security Forensic Diag-
nostic Hospital, at Holmesburg, Pa., Jan. 15, 1969; Dr. Richard G. Lonsdorf of the
faculty of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and staff of the Hospital of the
University of Pennsylvania, Jan. 15, 1969; and Dr. Bernard J. Willis & Dr. W. H.
Horan of the staff of Farview State Hospital, Feb. 7, 1969; cf. Morris, supra note 36,
at 525, which states:
Prison authorities regard their inmates in the facilities for the psychologically
disturbed as both criminal and insane, bad and mad; mental hospital authorities
regard their inmates who have been convicted-or only arrested and charged
with crime-as both insane and criminal, mad and bad. While examining
records in state mental hospitals, I occasionally find notations in red ink to
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is the patient's inability to view or to assess meaningfully the reality of
his situation. He is out of touch with the world around him. As long
as the charges remain, and the issue of guilt is unlitigated, the patient
does not have to cope with the circumstances surrounding the crime.
Disposition of the charges forces the patient toward a better under-
standing of reality. Furthermore, what some psychotics seek most
fervently in their chaotic environment is certainty and order-an
anchor in the real world."5 The person who has been at Farview
for thirty-three years may be unable to find certainty and order when
the effect that this person has been arrested for a crime. Discussion with the
relevant authorities reveals that the red ink notation seriously influences
the date of his likely discharge. Note that an arrest without a conviction
has this effect.
Contra, Interview with Dr. C. Fred Herring of the Psychiatric Clinic of the Probation
Department of the Court of Common Pleas and Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia,
Pa., Jan. 22, 1969, where he stated that it is preferable to dispose of the cases of
persons who will require long-term treatment by continuing the "incompetency"
commitment rather than nolle prossing the charges and civilly committing the patient.
In the former, a court must review the case before a patient is released onto the
street; thus, there is an additional safeguard against letting a potentially dangerous
patient loose before he is ready. In addition, the requirement of court approval for
partial release or out-patient care gives the treating psychiatrist additional leverage
(i.e., a court-ordered arrest of the patient), to secure compliance with a treatment plan.
The most deleterious hardship imposed on a patient not competent to stand trial
is that Farview is severely limited in the number and flexibility of treatment plans
available for the patient. As a result of a conference of superintendents of state mental
hospitals which was held at Farview in September of 1963, state hospitals no longer
refuse to admit any transferee from Farview who has criminal charges pending.
However, hospitals are still reluctant to accept these patients. See note 120 infra.
Further, Farview is much more cautious and selective in determining which patients
with charges pending are to be transferred than in the case of civilly committed
patients.
Two examples will serve to highlight the problems in securing the transfer of
patients. A patient suffering from paranoid schizophrenia has been at Farview since
1957, charged with indecent assault. He continues to need long-term hospitalization.
Were it not for the outstanding charges, he could be transferred to a Veterans
Administration hospital for appropriate treatment in a more suitable environment.
However, § 415(a) of the Mental Health & Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 50, § 4415(a) (Supp. 1969), prohibits the transfer to a Veterans Adminis-
tration hospital, or to a hospital in another state, of any patient who has pending
criminal charges. Another patient, a "chronic undifferentiated" schizophrenic also
in need of long-term hospitalization, has been at Farview since 1960. Charges pending
in the Juvenile Division include statutory rape, sodomy, and assault and battery with
intent to kill. It is clear that he will not improve in the near future. Yet § 415
prevents the hospital from tranferring the patient to a mental hospital in Puerto Rico
where he would be near his family.
The problems in flexibility of treatment are not limited to those of ease of adminis-
trative transfer. Farview's location makes the employment of out-patient or "work
out, sleep in" treatment plans all but impossible. Even if Farview were more favor-
ably located, neither these programs nor a leave of absence may be permitted without
court order. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4406(b), 4408(e) (Supp. 1969). The problem
is not merely one of red tape; many judges are more reluctant to permit these"uncured" individuals to walk the streets than are physicians.
38 For a vivid description of the dissolution of the world of a psychotic and subse-
quent construction of a delusional system to "structure" reality, see H. GREEN, I NEVER
PROMISED YOU A ROSE GARDEN (1964); T. RUBIN, CAT (1965).
During the clinical training program described, note 31 stpra, the author had
occasion to observe an interview with a teenage girl whose world had slowly crumbled
into total disintegration and whose mind had not yet imposed any kind of organization
or structure on the world around her. Her sense of helplessness, confusion and fear
as her world slipped away was overwhelming.
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he has charges outstanding which may require him to serve a five year
sentence. Thus, in order to facilitate treatment, it is necessary to
dispose of the criminal charges as soon as possible.3 Yet, the
broadened Moon standard permits commitment of a greater number
of persons charged with a crime than did the common law standard.
As a result, a greater number of mentally ill persons are committed to
Farview under circumstances which tend to impair their recovery.
In 1963, the Pennsylvania legislature addressed itself to the prob-
lem of returning to trial persons who had previously been committed
as incompetent to stand trial. Section 347 of the Mental Health Act
of 1951 40 originally provided for the return to court of a person com-
mitted while awaiting trial "[u]pon his recovery or sufficient improve-
ment of condition." 41 The legislature amended this section to re-
quire his return to court "[a]s soon as his condition has improved
sufficiently to enable him to participate intelligently in his own defense
... 1) -2 However, no change was made in section 344 which dealt
with petitions for commitment of persons detained in penal institutions
who were or were thought to be mentally ill. The 1963 amendment
created a statutory inconsistency in the treatment of persons awaiting
trial. The Moon standard of commitment was broader than the com-
mon law standard apparently enacted in 1963. Thus, a person who,
although mentally ill, could participate in his own defense could be
committed as mentally ill and then released immediately to stand trial
unless the phrase "participate intelligently in his own defense" was in-
tended as the standard for commitment. The Mental Health & Mental
Retardation Act of 1966 4 clarified this position. Section 408, con-
cerning persons detained in prison, essentially returned to the common
law test for commitment. That section stated:
In making such order for commitment the court shall give due
regard to the capacity of such person to understand the nature
and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his
own condition in reference to such proceedings, to understand
the nature of the punishment which might be inflicted upon
him, to confer with his counsel with reference to such pro-
ceedings, to make a rational defense, and the probable effect of
the trial on such person's physical and mental condition."
39 See generally TEMPLE UNIVERSITY UNIT IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY, STANDARD
LEGAL PROCEDURES IN THE DISPOSITION OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS 16-17 (1968)
(prepared for the Psychiatric Division of the Department of Probation of the Courts
of Common Pleas and Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia) [hereinafter cited as COURT
CLINIC MANUAL].
4O See No. 581, [1952] Pa. Laws 2067, amending No. 141, [1951] Pa. Laws 556
(repealed effective July 1, 1969).
41 Id.
42 No. 429, [1963] Pa. Laws 896 (repealed effective July 1, 1969).
4 2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-704 (Supp. 1969).
Id. § 4408(d).
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However, under section 407 of the 1966 Act,d a person released on
bail is to be committed "in the same manner as if he had not been so
charged with crime." The standard for civil commitment under the
1966 Act is substantially similar to the Moon standard.46 Although
the standards for commitment as incompetent to stand trial differ be-
tween persons released on bail and persons detained in a penal institu-
tion, the standard for return to court is "a sufficient improvement of
condition so that [the patient's] continued commitment is no longer
necessary . . . . " 7 This implies that the person released on bail
has to travel further on his road to recovery than does the person
detained, since he has to overcome his mental disability rather than
merely meet the common law standard of competency to stand trial.
Nevertheless, the 1966 Act has eliminated the possibility of a commit-
ment followed by an immediate release.
The case law concerning standards for incompetency to stand
trial does not reflect these statutory developments. In Commonwealth
v. Ballem,48 decided in 1956, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held it
was not reversible error for a court to deny defendant's motion for com-
mitment to a mental hospital in response to a report by psychiatrists that
the defendant was able to understand the proceedings against him and
assist counsel in his defense despite his mental illness. The trial court,
after considering the report and exercising its independent judgment
on the question, found that it was unnecessary to commit the defendant
and that he was competent to stand trial. The supreme court affirmed
on the ground that Moon required commitment for mental illness only
when the trial court found that the defendant's mental illness made
his commitment necessary or advisable.
However, in 1965 the court incorporated the common law standard
of competency to stand trial into the Moon standard of mental illness.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Hilberry v. Maroney,49 the court remanded
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the court of common pleas
in order to determine whether a self-confessed murderer was mentally
ill at the time he entered his guilty plea. The court declared that
the petitioner would be mentally ill if he was "unable to compre-
hend his position as one accused of murder and to co-operate [sic] with
his counsel in making a rational defense . . .. " o Ironically, the
court cited the Mental Health Act of 1951 and Moon, inter alia, for this
definition of mental illness. On a subsequent appeal from the trial
45 Id. § 4407(a).
46 See id. § 4406.
47 Id. § 4409(b).
48 386 Pa. 20, 123 A2d 728, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 932 (1956).
49 417 Pa. 534, 207 A2d 794 (1965).
o Id. at 544, 207 A2d at 799.
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court's dismissal of the petition, the supreme court affirmed the common
law standard of competency."
The issue of which competency test should be used was further
confused by the subsequent decision in Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins
v. Price." There the defendant was sane and competent, but had
received an injury at the time of the murder with which he was
charged. This injury had caused permanent amnesia regarding cir-
cumstances surrounding the crime. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
declared that there are two complementary standards for competency in
Pennsylvania." The court held, inter alia, that the Moon standard
only applies when the defendant is mentally ill within the definition
found in the Mental Health Act of 1951 and he is in need of hos-
pitalization and commitment. The court found the defendant competent
under the Moon standard since he did not need, nor had he or the
trial court requested, hospitalization for mental illness. It also held
that the defendant was not incompetent under the common law standard.
Thus, Cummins seems to return to the Moon standard of competency
whenever the accused falls within the 1951 Act's definition of mental
illness. Yet Hilberry applied the common law test of competency to a
petitioner alleged to be mentally ill.
Despite these conflicting opinions on the part of the supreme court,
the standard presently applied in Pennsylvania is the common law
standard.M A survey of the competency reports on file in the office
of the District Attorney of Philadelphia " revealed that these reports
invariably contain conclusory language that the patient does or does
not meet the common law criteria. The criteria for determination of
competency utilized by the Department of Probation of the Courts of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia are "the ability of the defendant to
understand the nature of the proceedings, to communicate with counsel
in his own defense, and the relevant criteria of the Mental Health
Act" 51 which, again, is a clear reflection of the common law criteria.
III. PROCEDURES FOR COMMITMENT
Under the Mental Health Act of 195 1,57 persons charged with a
crime could be recommended for commitment by designated officials or
by any responsible person. Section 342 of the Act 5 authorized the
51424 Pa. 493, 495, 227 A.2d 159, 160 (1967). See also Commonwealth ex rel.
Epps v. Myers, 197 Pa. Super. 145, 148-49, 177 A2d 28, 29 (1962) (dictum-test for
competency to stand trial is common law standard).
52421 Pa. 396, 218 A.2d 758, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 869 (1966).
63 d. at 404; 218 A.2d at 762-63.
54 Interviews cited note 37 supra.
55 Survey of the files of the District Attorney of Philadelphia conducted by Bert
Hoff, in Philadelphia, Pa., Dec. 12, 1968. [hereinafter cited as Survey]
56 COURT CLItIC MANUAL, supra note 39, at 16-17.
57 No. 141, [1951] Pa. Laws 533. Since this act is repealed effective July 1, 1969,
the commitments discussed in §§ I and II of the text were made under this act.
S8 No. 581, [1952] Pa. Laws 2065, amending No. 141, [1951] Pa. Laws 554
(repealed effective July 1, 1969).
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court to appoint a responsible person to petition for the civil commit-
ment of any person appearing before the court who "appears to be
mentally ill " or in need of care in a mental hospital . . ." Section
344 6 provided for a petition for commitment of any prisoner or any
person released on bail. Under section 344(a) (1), if any "person
detained in any penal or correctional institution . . . is thought to be
mentally ill or in such condition that he requires care in a mental
hospital," the prisoner's counsel, an executive officer of the institution,
or any other responsible person may petition for the prisoner's commit-
ment. The standard for commitment of a person on bail under section
344(a) (2) was that he be "thought to be mentally ill."
After the court received a petition for commitment, section 345 01
required the court to order an examination of the person thought to be
mentally ill. The examination must be conducted by two qualified
physicians or by a commission comprising an attorney and two qualified
physicians. The doctors or commission must give advance notice of
their meeting to the patient's attorney and family. If, on receipt of the
report, the court is satisfied that the accused is "mentally ill," it must
notify these persons, who may request a hearing under section 345 (b).
If none of these persons requests a hearing, the court under section
345 (c) may determine to conduct such a hearing on its own initiative.
The Mental Health & Mental Retardation Act of 196602 elim-
inates the dichotomy between defendants who appear to be mentally ill
when they are present in court and defendants detained in prison or on
bail who are the subject of a petition for commitment filed in the court.
Instead, it establishes different procedures for defendants on bail and
those who are detained in prison.'
69 Section 102(11) of the Act defined mental illness as follows:
"Mental illness" shall mean an illness which so lessens the capacity of a
person to use his customary self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct
of his affairs and social relations as to make it necessary or advisable for him
to be under care. The term shall include "insanity," "unsoundness of mind,"
"lunacy," "mental disease," "mental disorder," and all other types of mental
cases, but the term shall not include "mental deficiency," "epilepsy," "in-
ebriety," or "senility," unless mental illness is superimposed.
No. 581, [1952] Pa. Laws 2055, amending No. 141, [1951] Pa. Laws 539 (repealed
effective July 1, 1969).
00 No. 152, [1957] Pa. Laws 297, amending No. 626, [1956] Pa. Laws 1897
(repealed effective July 1, 1969). Section 344 was rewritten in 1956. The original
language may be found at No. 581, [1952] Pa. Laws 2065-66, amending No. 141, [1951]
Pa. Laws 555-56.
61 No. 141, [1951] Pa. Laws 556 (repealed effective July 1, 1969).
6
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4401-704 (Supp. 1969).
03 This procedural dichotomy between persons detained in a penal or correctional
institution and those released on bail raises the constitutional issue of equal protection.
Under § 407 of the 1966 Act, proceedings to commit a person released on bail are the
same as those for civil commitment. The lack of procedural safguards in these § 407
provisions represents a disturbing step backwards from the 1951 Act provisions relating
to persons on bail. The minimal due process safeguards of the 1951 Act, that under
§ 345(a), No. 141, [1951] Pa. Laws 556 (repealed effective July 1, 1969), the court
must notify the relatives and attorney of the accused of an examination report recom-
mending commitment and that the relatives or attorney under § 345(b), id., may demand
1969]
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Section 407(a),' for example, outlines procedures to be employed
where the defendant is on bail pending trial. It provides that a de-
fendant who "is or becomes mentally disabled" so that his admission
or commitment to a facility is necessary" should be committed "in the
same manner as if he had not been so charged with crime"; thus, a
person released on bail is civilly committed. The provisions for civil
commitment which are normally applicable to a person released on bail
can be found in section 404 '6 (commitment directly to a hospital after
application by a responsible person, accompanied by certificates of two
physicians) and section 406 67 (civil court commitment). There are
no procedural safeguards in section 404 other than those providing that
the superintendent of the hospital receiving the application must notify
a relative or friend,s and that the commitment must be reviewed at
least annually by a committee selected from the hospital's staff . 9 Civil
proceedings under section 40610 are begun by filing a petition for
"immediate examination or commitment to an appropriate facility for
examination, observation and diagnosis." 71 The petition must "set
forth the facts upon which the petitioner bases his belief of mental dis-
ability . ... " 12 The person sought to be committed must be ex-
amined by one or more physicians before the petition is filed, or, if the
petitioner has not been able to have the patient examined prior to
filing the petition, the petition must state "the efforts made to secure
examination." '¢ Upon receipt of the petition, the court must notify
an in-court hearing after the examination, have been entirely eliminated. Since the
use of a commission has been abolished in civil commitment proceedings, there appears
to be no way to permit a patient to "participate" in the examination rather than merely
be examined. In view of the procedural safeguards which § 408, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
50, § 4408 (Supp. 1969), provides for persons detained in a penal or correctional
institution, text accompanying notes 78-86 infra, a high price is placed on the exercise
of one's right to bail. The 1966 Act establishes an invidious discrimination between
persons on bail and those detained for want of bail, which is in no way related to the
purposes of the Act. No special circumstances of persons on bail, as opposed to
incarcerated persons, warrants denying them the safeguards which the legislature
recognizes must be granted to those in detention awaiting trial. Consequently, the
failure of § 407 to provide the same procedural safeguards to those released on bail
that are provided by § 408 to those detained, is a denial of equal protection and violates
the fourteenth amendment.
64 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4407(a) (Supp. 1969).
G5 The 1966 Act substitutes the term "mental disability" for the term "mental
illness" used in the 1951 Act. However, the definition of "mental disability" in the
1966 Act, id. § 4102, is substantially equivalent to the definition of "mental illness" in
the 1951 Act. For the definition of "mental illness," see note 59 supra.
66 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4404 (Supp. 1969).
67 Id. § 4406.
68 Id. § 4404(c).
09 Id. § 4404(d). Section 426 of the 1966 Act, id. § 4426, provides that a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus is available to a person committed by any procedure, and
that the hospital has the burden of justifying the patient's continued detention.
OlId. § 4406.
71Id. §4406(a).
72 Id. § 4406(a) (2).
73 Id.
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interested parties and hold a hearing.74 After the hearing the court
may order an immediate examination by two physicians or commit the
patient for up to ten days for examination. 5 If examination reveals
that "such person is in need of care at a facility," the doctors or
superintendent of the hospital where the patient was committed for
examination must so report to the court.7 6 The court may then order
commitment "for care and treatment." 7' There is no provision for
examination by a commission in a civil commitment; nor does the
statute grant the patient any right to present his case at the examination.
Neither is there provision for a hearing in court after the court receives
the report of the examination.
The provisions for commiting a person detained in a penal or
correctional institution contain certain procedural safeguards absent
from the provisions for commitment of a person released on bail. A
petition for the commitment of a person detained in jail before trial,
under section 408,78 may be presented to the court by a prison official,
a relative of the prisoner, the prisoner himself, his attorney, or the
"attorney for the Commonwealth." 7 Such person may file a petition
when he believes the defendant to be "mentally disabled so that his
commitment to a facility is necessary . . . . " The court may then
employ any or all of the following procedures: " (1) an examination
in jail by two or more physicians to determine whether the defendant
is mentally disabled and whether commitment is necessary; (2) appoint-
ment of a commission to examine the accused in jail "and receive any
other evidence from any source" 82 bearing on whether the person is
mentally disabled and whether commitment is necessary; (3) appoint an
attorney for the accused; (4) hold a public or private hearing after giv-
ing appropriate notice "to all interested parties." ' A physician may
request commitment for a period not exceeding sixty days for further
examination. 4 Subsection (d) provides:
After consideration of the petition and all evidence pre-
sented, the court may order the commitment . . . if satisfied
that the person is mentally disabled and that his commitment
is necessary. In making such order the court shall give due
regard to the capacity of such person to understand the nature
and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his
7r4Id. §4406 (a) (3).
75 Id. §4406 (a) (4).
76 Id. §4406 (b).
77 Id.
78 Id. §4408 (Supp. 1969).
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own condition in reference to such proceedings, to understand
the nature of the punishment which might be inflicted upon
him, to confer with his counsel with reference to such proceed-
ings, to make a rational defense, and the probable effect of the
trial on such person's physical and mental condition.5
It should be noted there is no similar language in section 407. Unlike
section 406 (civil court commitment made applicable to bail cases by
section 407), section 408 permits the court to appoint a commission,
appoint an attorney to represent the accused, and/or hold a hearing.
The effect of these provisions is to permit the accused, in the discretion
of the court, to present his case to the court and to challenge effectively
the conclusions reached by the examining body. However, despite the
seeming concern for safeguards in the confinement provisions, these are
not guaranteed. In light of the possibility that an order of commitment
following these proceedings may result in the commitment of the accused
to Farview for an indeterminate period, one would expect these minimal
procedural safeguards to be mandatory, rather than discretionary with
the court. Providing only for challenge of commitment through the
habeas corpus process may be much less effective than the right to
challenge the proceedings as they are taking place since witnesses or
vital evidence may be lost and the patient is necessarily deprived of his
liberty prior to issuance of the writ.!'
The procedures for committing a person charged with a crime may
have constitutional infirmities. First, section 408 of the Act of 1966
pertaining to commitment of persons presently detained leaves in the
discretion of the court the decision whether or not to grant a hearing
on the prisoner's incompetency. In Pate v. Robinson, 7 the trial court
denied the petitioner a hearing on his incompetency to stand trial and
convicted him of first-degree murder. The Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed on the grounds that the petitioner failed to request a hear-
ing, that the evidence was not sufficient to cause the trial court to order
a hearing on its own motion, and that there was no reasonable doubt
as to the petitioner's sanity at the time of the murder.8"
On a hearing of a petition for habeas corpus, the United States
Supreme Court found that "the uncontradicted testimony of Robinson's
history of pronounced irrational behavior" 89 "entitled him to a hear-
ing" o on the issue of his competency to stand trial. To try and convict
a defendant who is legally incompetent to stand trial is a violation of
851d. §4408(2).
86See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966) ; Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402 (1960).
87383 U.S. 375 (1966).
88 Id. at 376-77.
89 Id. at 385-86.
9o Id. at 385.
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due process: that is, he is denied his right to a fair trial.f1 Consequently,
the Court held when the evidence raises a reasonable doubt concerning
the defendant's competency, denial of a hearing on his competency is an
unconstitutional proceeding.
Since the Act of 1966 authorizes a hearing on the prisoner's com-
petency at the court's discretion, the Act, to avoid conflict with Robin-
son, must be construed to mandate a hearing whenever the court faces
a reasonable doubt as to the prisoner's competency to stand trial. Of
course, Robinson does not hold that a prisoner is entitled to an oppor-
tunity to prove himself competent when there is evidence indicating his
incompetency.
An analogous situation is presented when a defendant convicted of
a sex crime is sentenced under a separate statute authorizing up to life
imprisonment for dangerous or habitual sex offenders. In this situa-
tion, the defendant strives to prove that he is not dangerous or an
habitual offender. In Specht v. Patterson,"2 the Supreme Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of the Colorado Sex Offenders Act which
authorized an indeterminate sentence for one who is found to constitute
"a threat of bodily harm to members of the public, or is an habitual
offender and mentally ill." 11 The Act did not provide for a hearing
with right of confrontation and cross-examination. The Court found
that the Sex Offenders Act was triggered by conviction of a sex crime
and resulted in a new criminal charge with new findings of fact. As
such, it was a criminal proceeding requiring the procedural safeguards
mandated by the fourteenth amendment.
Specht, of course, did not involve an individual committed as
incompetent to stand trial, but its rationale is applicable to commitment
cases. Commitment procedures are not triggered by a conviction. In
fact, civil commitment procedures are utilized for the patient previously
released on bail. Since a person charged with a crime, but not convicted,
should not be subject to criminal proceedings, the Act of 1966 might
be considered to provide greater procedural safeguards for persons
detained than may be constitutionally required since commitment as
incompetent is not penal, but therapeutic. However, as was docu-
mented earlier in this Comment, 5 the therapeutic quality of an
institution such as Farview is seriously in question. Therefore, the
Specht doctrine is applicable if one can say (as the evidence certainly
shows) that commitment to Farview is penal.*6
01 Id. at 378, 385.
92 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
93 Id. at 607.
94 Accord United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966).
0 Text accompanying notes 1-19 mepra.
96 Were Farview truly therapeutic then Specht would certainly not apply. Although
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), demonstrates that the availability of due process
safeguards does not hinge on the label "criminal" being applied to a proceeding, the
fact remains that prisoners committed as incompetent are not committed as punishment
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IV. RAISING THE ISSUE OF PRE-TRIAL COMMITMENT
It is not entirely clear how the issue of the competency of a de-
fendant to stand trial is most frequently raised. A survey of the files
of the District Attorney of Philadelphia conducted December 12, 1968,"
indicates that in most recorded cases the issue was raised by the warden
of a prison (or sometimes the Philadelphia General Hospital) where
the defendant was incarcerated before trial. In a few cases, the issue
was raised on motion by an assistant district attorney, or by the
defense counsel. In one case, the district attorney and the defendant's
court-appointed attorney visited the defendant in a jail cell and observed
the defendant to be very withdrawn and quite obviously mentally ill. In
two or three instances, the staff of a local mental hospital asked the
district attorney to begin proceedings against an inmate who had
attacked another inmate or member of the staff. The Philadelphia
District Attorney's office has no established program for instituting
proceedings against one suspected of being incompetent to stand trial;
on the contrary, it is done infrequently on an ad hoc basis and usually
in circumstances where a bizarre crime has occurred or a history of
mental illness comes to the attention of an assistant district attorney.9
8
On the other hand, the district attorney routinely requests the Psychi-
atric Division of the Department of Probation of the Courts of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia (referred to hereinafter as the Court Psychiatric
Clinic) to give an incompetency examination to all persons charged
with murder. 9
Most incompetency hearings are commenced when prison officials
have some reason to suspect that a defendant incarcerated in lieu of
bail is incompetent. 00 This may be revealed by bizarre behavior dur-
ing the incarceration, discovered by the physician giving the routine
for the crime with which they are charged. It has been asserted that commitment for
incompetency is merely an alternative means whereby the prosecution or court can
dispose of criminal charges. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 171-220; PRESIDENT'S
COMMIfSSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 133-34 (1967). Actually, commitment as incom-
petent is 1 of 3 means of disposing of the person charged criminally; the other 2 are
findings of innocence or guilt. If the individual is incompetent, to convict him is to
deny him a fair trial in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). If the court has a reasonable doubt about the pris-
oner's competence, he should not be tried. Where such doubt exists, commitment is not
penal and should be treated as other civil commitments in the absence of more stringent,
statutory procedures when the rehabilitating institution is truly therapeutic. However,
this is certainly not the case with Farview.
97 Survey, .supra note 55.
W5 Interview with Jeff Brodkin, Assistant District Attorney of Philadelphia, in
Philadelphia, Dec. 12, 1968.
99 Interview with Dr. C. Fred Herring, supra note 37.
100 Interview with Dr. Edward B. Guy, stpra note 37.
About half of the requests for an incompetency examination received by the Court
Psychiatric Clinic originate from the Holmesburg Detention Center, Holmesburg, Pa.
The remainder originate with the court upon motion by the prosecution or defense.
Interview with Dr. C. Fred Herring, .ufpra note 37.
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in-coming medical examination, or disclosed while recording the pris-
oner's medical history. It is apparent that violent prisoners, ones with
markedly bizarre behavior, and extremely withdrawn patients are much
more likely to come to the attention of prison officials than prisoners
who may be mentally ill but who quietly serve their time and do not
draw attention to themselves.
Prior to the establishment of the Court Psychiatric Clinic, com-
petency examinations in Philadelphia were conducted more frequently
by a commission than by two physicians. 1 Since the clinic's establish-
ment, however, the court invariably proceeds with an examination
by the clinic's physicians.:"" The court and the clinic both view the
role of the clinic as that of an impartial "friend of the court" rather
than a participant in the adversary proceeding. 1 3  During the exam-
ination by the clinic, the doctors ask questions such as "Do you know
what you are charged with?" and "Do you know what burglary is?"
Evaluation is on the basis of the answers to these questions, general
responsiveness, general mental status, and ability to understand the
questions asked and to answer in a rational manner. The clinic's staff
attempts to understand the dynamics of the person examined as well
as his dangerousness. The Court Clinic Manual, in discussing pre-
trial competency examinations, states:
Diagnosis and prognosis may include such relevant factors as
weakness or strength of ego control, degree of impulsivity,
potential for physical violence and need for follow-up consid-
eration, rather than being limited to a broad, general con-
clusion of dangerousness at the pre-trial level.'0 4
Because the staff of the Court Psychiatric Clinic considers it necessary
to dispose of the criminal charges as soon as possible, the staff will re-
solve doubts about competency in favor of a finding of competency
rather than incompetency.10 5 Although the examination is more ex-
tensive when the patient is charged with a serious crime, there is no
conscious attempt to correlate the standard of competency to the
intricacy of the crime. Findings generally include a statement of the
defendant's competency (usually phrased in the conclusory language
101 Survey, supra note 55.
102 Interview with Dr. C. Fred Herring, spra note 37. Except where noted
otherwise, the information in the remainder of this paragraph in the text originated
in this interview.
103 For this reason, the staff of the Clinic avoids dealing with any material bearing
on the patient's criminal responsibility, if possible, and also tries to avoid material
concerning the offense with which the patient is charged.
104 CoURT CLINIC MAwuAL, supra note 39, at 7; see Comment, Competency to
Stand Trial, 59 MIcH L. REv. 1078, 1082 (1961) (stressing that psychiatrists fre-
quently misconceive their role as protecting society or the patient rather than deter-
mining competency).
105 Interview with Dr. Edward B. Guy, supra note 37.
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of the common law test of competency),106 whether he should be com-
mitted, and to what institution he should be sent. Frequently, where
the issue of competency is unclear, the clinic will request the judge to
order a sixty-day confinement to the Eastern Diagnostic and Classifica-
tion Center at Holmesburg, Pennsylvania, for further evaluation.
Proceedings at Tlolmesburg are similar to those outlined above.
If the patient is found to be incompetent to stand trial, must he
be committed to Farview State Hospital? Section 345 (d) of the
Mental Health Act of 1951,' 7 concerning persons charged with or
sentenced for a crime, required the court to commit persons found to be
mentally ill or "found to have a criminal tendency" to "a State hospital
for patients convicted of crime, charged with crime, or with criminal
tendencies." Section 230(b) of the Act of 1951 '0s designated Farview
as "exclusively devoted to the care of patients convicted of crime or
with criminal tendencies." In 1963, the legislature amended this section
to add to those patients committed to Farview "persons requiring
maximum supervision." 1'9 Consequently, under the 1951 Act, a person
charged with a crime who was found incompetent to stand trial would
be committed to Farview if he required "maximum supervision" or
displayed "criminal tendencies." Section 102(4) 110 defined "criminal
tendency" as "a tendency to repeat offenses against the law or to
perpetrate new offenses, as shown by repeated convictions for such
offenses or tendency to habitual delinquency."
Judicial construction may have been responsible for the 1963
amendment. In Commonwealth v. Martin," the court based its finding
of criminal tendencies on evidence that the defendant, charged on two
counts of forcible rape, had been incarcerated as a juvenile delinquent,
that he had been fined for disorderly conduct for being "improper" with
a woman, and that a prosecution for assault with intent to ravish
against him had failed due to the illness and subsequent unavailability
of a prosecution witness. The court implied that four arrests, even
without four convictions, indicated a tendency toward habitual de-
linquency. In Commonwealth v. Bechtel," 2 the defendant, a college
student, shot and killed another student in a dormitory as part of his
plan to slaughter all dormitory residents. In addition to finding the
10 Survey, supra note 55.
107 No. 581, [1952] Pa. Laws 2066, 2067, amending No. 141, Pa. Laws 556 (re-
pealed effective July 1, 1969). Since the 1951 Act was in effect at the time this study
was made, commitment procedures discussed herein were in large part conducted under
the 1951 Act.
108 No. 581, [1952] Pa. Laws 2065, amending No. 141, [1951] Pa. Laws 546
(repealed effective July 1, 1969).
109 No. 444, [1963] Pa. Laws 976, 977 (repealed effective July 1, 1969).
110 No. 141, [1951] Pa. Laws 538 (repealed effective July 1, 1969).
1126 Pa. D. & C.2d 509 (Chester County Ct.), aff'd 197 Pa. Super. 602, 180
A.2d 101 (1962).
112 384 Pa. 184, 120 A.2d 295 (1956).
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defendant clearly and homicidally insane, the supreme court found
criminal tendencies in the defendant's homicidal thoughts as a child and
in his attacking another man while serving in the Air Force, because the
defendant mistakenly thought he had stolen some records. Apparently,
the court feared the consequences of committing the defendant to any
state hospital other than Farview which was the only maximum secu-
rity hospital available under the 1951 Act at that time. In order to
place the defendant in Farview, the court was forced to stretch the
definition of criminal tendencies to include an obviously dangerous
person. This lacuna in criteria for commitment to Farview was cor-
rected in 1963 when the legislature extended Farview's domain to
include persons requiring maximum supervision.
The provisions of section 342 of the 1951 Act," permitting the
court to appoint any responsible person to petition for the commitment
of any individual appearing before the court who "appears to be mentally
ill," require civil commitment. A petition for civil commitment made
under section 326(c) as originally enacted 114 had to designate the
type of institution the mentally ill person required. The court then
committed that person to the designated institution."5  Since Farview
at that time treated only convicted criminals or those persons with
criminal tendencies, civil commitment to Farview of a person appearing
before the court was necessarily based on his criminal tendencies, which
was an extraordinarily flexible standard." In 1961, the Pennsylvania
legislature amended sections 326(c) and 328(c) of the 1951 Act 117 with
the result that the court assigned persons civilly committed to the
Pennsylvania "Department of Public Welfare for treatment in an ap-
propriate institution." Of course, Farview was the only appropriate
institution for persons with "criminal tendencies."
Although the Act of 1966 completely revised the commitment
system to a particular institution, the effects of the change are likely to
be negligible in the near future. Under section 202 (a),"' the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare "shall operate all state facilities and shall assign
such functions to each as the secretary shall prescribe." It seems un-
likely that Farview's function will be changed significantly by the
Department. Hopefully, other state hospitals will be adapted to treat
those patients now committed exclusively to Farview in order to
ameliorate the overcrowded conditions. Section 401 (c)".9 states:
113 No. 581, [1952] Pa. Laws 2065, amending No. 141, [1951] Pa. Laws 554
(repealed effective July 1, 1969).
114 No. 141, [1951] Pa. Laws 552 (repealed effective July 1, 1969).
15 Id. 553.
1143 Interview with Dr. C. Fred Herring, spra note 37. The staff of the Court
Psychiatric Clinic has not been troubled with difficulties in finding legal justification
for a diagnosis of criminal tendencies whenever the staff felt the accused was dan-
gerous. Id.
I17 No. 648, [1961] Pa. Laws 1529 (repealed effective July 1, 1969).
I's PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4202(a) (Supp. 1969).
119 Id. § 4401 (c).
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Whenever a court commits any person under any pro-
vision of this act, it may commit such person directly to a
facility willing and able to receive him; otherwise, the court
shall commit to a designated local or State facility ....
Only Farview is presently "willing and able" to treat persons found
incompetent to stand trial. Therefore, as a practical matter, there is no
alternative to Farview. 2 0
V. STANDARDS FOR RELEASE
After commitment to Farview Hospital, a patient has two primary
concerns: recovery of his mental health and his release. Recovery of
competence is the central purpose for his commitment as incompetent; 12
extraneous purposes, such as protection of society, can be achieved by
use of the state's police power." 2 The standards for commitment
should be matched by the standards for release because the only valid
purpose of commitment ceases when the patient recovers his com-
petency.'3 However, the Pennsylvania courts and legislature have
created a standard under which a patient may only be returned to trial
after he is sufficiently cured to return to society. Therefore, they have
totally overlooked the more realistic standard: that is, when he has
regained the ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against
him and to effectively assist his counsel.
20Although superintendents of hospitals other than Farview will not refuse
to admit a transferee from Farview, they are extremely reluctant to admit someone
against whom criminal charges are pending, primarily because they are highly sensi-
tive to adverse community reaction. For example, in the summer of 1968, the Phila-
delphia news media and the Northeast Civic Association brought great pressure against
the director of the Philadelphia State Hospital at Byberry, Pa., in reaction to a number
of heinous crimes committed by patients who had escaped from that institution. To
lessen the possibility of adverse community pressure, the directors are likely to reject
patients charged with a crime. Interviews with Drs. Edward B. Guy & C. Fred
Herring, supra note 37.
121 See Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956) ; Foote, A Comment
on Pre-trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 832, 838, 841
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Foote] ; Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 7,
at 461-65. This justification for detaining the patient in an institution fails if the
institution does not provide the treatment necessary to restore competency. United
States v. Klein, 325 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1963); Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415
(D.C. Cir. 1953).
'=2 See Morris, supra note 36, at 525:
The police power and the mental health power are surely sufficient sep-
arately to control questions of dangerousness and the maxima of state power
over individual citizens. It is a mutually corruptive, potent source of injustice
loosely and thoughtlessly to blend these two powers, and thus to gloss over
in each the proper balance between state power and the freedom of the
individual ...
Contra, Commonwealth v. Cook, 390 Pa. 516, 135 A.2d 751 (1957).
1= In State v. Swails, 223 La. 751, 66 So.2d 796 (1953), the court held that a
patient had a right to be tried if he met the common law standard of competency,
even though on other criteria he would remain hospitalized.
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The Mental Health Act of 1951, as amended shortly after its
enactment, provided under section 347 '2 for a stay of proceedings until
the defendant's "recovery or sufficient improvement," at which time he
was to be returned to court for "trial or such other disposition of such
charges as the court may make." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
considered the release of a defendant committed prior to trial in
Commonwealth v. Cook.'25 In this case, the petitioner Cook had been
committed to Farview in 1939 following his commission of a "brutal
triple murder." In 1956, the director of Farview petitioned the court
for an order discharging the defendant into the custody of the sheriff
of Beaver County to stand trial on the ground that the defendant no
longer required Farview's custodial and remedial care. The district
attorney opposed the petition on the ground that the defendant was
mentally ill and of doubtful competence. A court-appointed commis-
sion found that the defendant was still mentally ill and of criminal
tendencies. The trial court, in refusing to release the patient, cited the
fact that one of the purposes of the Mental Health Act was the protection
of society from dangerously insane criminals and emphasized the possi-
bility that the defendant would be acquitted of the three charges pending
and thus would go free.'26 The supreme court affirmed on the lower
court's opinion, adding:
In substance, Cook's contention is that when one is com-
mitted to a mental institution because he is incapable of co-
operating with his attorney in planning and presenting his
defense he should be released and brought to trial when suffi-
ciently recovered to assist his attorney in these matters. This
has no application to the case at bar in which Cook was com-
mitted because of a type of mental incapacity which makes
him liable to commit violent criminal misconduct if he is free
from custody and restraint and is sufficiently irritated or
provoked. The fact [sic] a person could assist his attorney in
preparation for trial does not alone determine his sanity.
2 7
Despite the fact that the primary purpose of the entire Mental
Health Act of 1951 may be the protection of society from dangerously
124No. 581, [1952] Pa. Laws 2067, amending No. 141, [1951] Pa. Laws 556 (re-
pealed 1963).
125 390 Pa. 516, 135 A.2d 751 (1957); accord Commonwealth ex rel. Fritz v.
Farview State Hosp. Superintendent, 174 Pa. Super. 609, 101 A.2d 922 (1953).
126 390 Pa. at 519-20, 135 A.2d at 753.
127 Id. at 520, 135 A2d at 753-54.
The standard of competency at the time Cook was decided was the Moon test
rather than the common law test. Text accompanying notes 20-26 supra. The Cook
opinion may be read as deciding that the standard for release is identical to the stand-
ard for commitment, i.e., mental illness. If the case is read in that manner, it no longer
has precedential value for the detained defendant because the test of his competency
has since become his ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him
and to assist his counsel, i.e., the common law test. See text accompanying notes
43-44 supra. However, the Moon test still applies to persons released on bail who
are committed under civil commitment procedures.
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insane defendants, the court should not have allowed the purpose of the
entire Act to obscure the purpose of that portion of the Act concerning
commitment for incompetency. The incompetent person may be no
more dangerous than any sane individual; his commitment is first and
foremost to prepare him for trial. That he has been charged with a
crime does not, in itself, prove his danger to society.123 The supreme
court should have taken into account the fact that a patient competent
to stand trial may still be committed on civil grounds if he is acquitted
of the crime but presents a continuing danger to society.
Section 347 of the 1951 Act was amended in 1963 'l to require
the patient's return to court "for the disposition of the charges" "[a] s
soon as his condition has improved sufficiently to enable him to par-
ticipate in his own defense." :" The only case decided between the
passage of the amendment and the enactment of the Act of 1966 is
Commonwealth ex rel. Wolenski v. Shovlin,'3 ' which was a habeas
corpus petition by the patient seeking return to court for trial. The
Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County ordered examinations by
the Farview staff and an independent physician. The Farview report
stated that the defendant "does not now have the capacity to conduct
the criminal proceedings against him in a meaningful manner." 132 The
report of the osteopath from Philadelphia who conducted the inde-
pendent examination made no mention of capacity to stand trial, but
stressed that the patient was acutely psychotic and that the prognosis
was poor. 3' The trial court stated that to try the patient would be a
useless formality because "the relator continues to be mentally ill." 134
The supreme court affirmed dismissal of the petition on the ground that
the petitioner had failed to comply with the statutory procedures for
release. The court stated in dicta that the petitioner would need an
affidavit from an independent physician declaring that he was no longer
mentally ill.'85 The court's mental illness test for release ignored the
statute's standard of competency set forth in section 347.
28 See Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 413 (Phila. County Ct. 1959).
129 See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra concerning the statutory inconsistency
created by this amendment.
130 No. 429, [1963] Pa. Laws 896 (repealed effective July 1, 1969).
131419 Pa. 35, 213 A2d 327 (1965).
132 Brief for Appellee at 11-12, Wolenski v. Shovlin, 419 Pa. 35, 213 A.2d 327
(1965).
133 d. at 9-10.
134 Civil No. 13, 729 (Del. County C.P., Feb. 17, 1965).
1a5 See 419 Pa. at 40 n.5, 213 A.2d at 330 n.5, where the court, citing 50 PA. STAT.
AN. § 1075 (1954), defined mental illness as
an illness which so lessens the capacity of a person to use his customary
self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social
relations as to make it necessary or advisable for him to be under care . ...
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In 1966, the legislature appeared to return to the Cook test for
release. Section 409 1' of the Mental Health & Mental Retardation
Act of 1966 provides for the return to court "for trial or such other
disposition of such charges as the court may make" of a person who
"shows a sufficient improvement of condition so that his continued
commitment is no longer necessary . . . . " The 1966 Act also
contains a new provision which permits a prosecuting attorney to re-
quire the mental hospital to show cause why the accused should not
stand trial.
137
If the Pennsylvania courts continue to detain persons committed
as incompetent until they are no longer dangerous to society, the patient
may be deprived of his right of a speedy trial in violation of the
sixth amendment. 3 " Since the purpose of committing a defendant
as incompetent is largely to restore him to competence, and thus assure
him of a fair trial, any detention beyond his regaining competence un-
necessarily delays his trial." 9 This delay can defeat the purposes of
the guarantee of a speedy trial described by the Supreme Court:
This guarantee is an important safeguard to prevent undue
and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety
and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the
possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an
accused to defend himself."4
The antitherapeutic effects of failure to dispose of charges pending
against a patient make the guarantee of a speedy trial particularly im-
portant. In the view of a patient at Farview, delaying his release for
trial is oppressive incarceration which increases his anxiety.'41 Both
effects of delay defeat the purposes of the guarantee of a speedy trial. 4 '
So long as a person committed as incompetent to stand trial is detained
beyond regaining competence, the state is denying him this consti-
tutional right. 43
VI. PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF RELEASE FROM FARVIEW
The initial decision whether to release a patient and return him to
court for disposition of the charges against him rests with the staff at
: 36 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §4409(b) (Supp. 1969).
'-37Id. § 4409(c).
138 In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), the Supreme Court held
that the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial applies to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. A similar right appears in PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9.
139 See note 146 infra.
14OUnited States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
141 Text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
'
4 2 See generally Foote, supra note 121, at 838-39, 842; 108 U. PA. L. REv.
414 (1960).
143 Any interest the state may have in protecting society may be satisfied by civil
commitment after disposing of the criminal charges.
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Farview. The patient is returned to court only if a "staff" conference 144
results in the conclusion that the patient is competent to stand trial. A
"staff" may be requested by the patient or it may be held to answer an
an inquiry by a court, prosecutor, or (not infrequently) the patient's
family or attorney concerning the patient's status. Following an inquiry
by any of the above persons, a "staff" will be held unless it is clear to the
physician in charge of the patient's ward that there has been no change in
the patient's condition since the last "staff." If a patient shows sufficient
improvement, the physician in charge of the ward may order a "staff"
without receiving an inquiry. 45
There is no standard procedure for periodic formal staff review
of the status of patients awaiting trial. 4 All "staffs" are initiated in
one of the ways outlined above. Necessarily, this process must be
somewhat random. In 1968, fewer than 500 staff conferences were held
for a population of about 1200.'7 About 120 of these were "intake
diagnostic." 148 In a small number of cases, a person is reviewed twice
in one calendar year. Thus, the number of persons whose status is
formally reviewed in any given year is small. However, only in a
very small number of the files which the author reviewed had there
144 A "staff" is a quasi-formal review of a patient's status by the entire treatment
staff of the institution. The presenting physician presents a social history of the patient,
his prior criminal record and history of treatment for mental illness, facts and circum-
stances surrounding his arrest and/or commitment, and the findings of earlier psycho-
logical tests and "staff" conferences. A psychologist then summarizes the results
of the latest psychological tests. The patient is then brought into the room and
asked questions by the presenting physician. When the presenting physician has fin-
ished, other members of the staff are free to ask questions of the patient. The patient
is then dismissed and the staff discusses his status. Interview with Dr. John Moran,
supra note 2.
145 Id.
146But see AmERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw
367 (1961).
Frequent periodic mental examinations should be made of all defendants
hospitalized as incompetent and those found presently competent should be
returned promptly for further proceedings.
This would prevent an accused from languishing indefinitely in custody
without the opportunity of reaching trial on the criminal charge-a charge of
which he may very well be innocent. By permitting a trial as soon as possible
after recovery, this procedure would go far toward securing the benefits of a
speedy trial for both the defendant and the state.
147 Interview with Dr. John Moran, supra note 2. In 1967, there were 448 "staffs"
which returned 21 patients to court. Focus: Voice of the Patients, June 1968, at 10.
The results of all staff referrals in 1967 are:
Number of hospitalized patients recommended for discharge to the
community .............................................. 5
Transfer to civil hospitals ................................... 43
Return to court for disposition of case ........................ 21
Return to prison for completion of sentence ................... 17
Further care and treatment .................................. 242
New admissions. (Diagnosis) ................................ 120
Total of patients diagnosed and evaluated for 1967 ............ 448
148 The term "intake diagnostic" refers to a mental examination of incoming
patients conducted during normal in-processing.
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been no "staff" in the last 5 years. Most of the files showed an
evaluation within the last 2 years.149 Where there is no formal
evaluation, the hospital relies on informal ward notes entered in the
patient's file and on the general knowledge each doctor has of the status
of every patient in the wards for which he has responsibility. There
are about 500 personal doctor-prisoner contacts a month; 'W the doctor
also bases his general knowledge of the patients on oral reports and
comments made to him by the custodial staff and various therapy
department staff members. Philadelphia prisoners represented by the
Defender Association have the benefits of an additional periodic review.
A member of the Defender's Association of Philadelphia visits Farview
about every three months. In addition to interviewing patients, he
routinely reviews the files on men represented by his office. If there is
any sign of improvement, he requests that the staff make a formal
evaluationY'1
The author observed two Farview staff conferences which con-
sidered patients' competency to stand trial. The first involved a twenty
year old, white male who had been released on bail after an arrest for
throwing a rock through a church window while drunk. Shortly there-
after, the patient was re-arrested for jaywalking in direct disobedience
to a policeman's order. After tearing up his jail cell a few times, he
was transferred to the local state hospital; the local hospital, unable to
control him, transferred him to Farview in January 1969. He was
diagnosed as having mild mental retardation and an explosive person-
ality, but he had no signs of psychosis. There was no discussion of the
patient's ability to confer with counsel or understand the nature of the
proceedings against him. The staff reached the conclusion that the
patient was incompetent, because they feared that he was close to a
psychotic breakdown, and that the stress of trial would be too great for
his explosive personality to handle. Moreover, one psychologist ex-
plained to me that the patient was unfit to stand trial because he was
still too dangerous to be allowed on the streets.
The second "staff" reviewed the status of an eighteen year old,
white male who stood accused of murder, burglary, larceny, receiving
stolen goods, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and a violation of
the Uniform Firearms Act. He was sent to Farview after he made a
suicide attempt in the Maximum Security Forensic Diagnostic Hospital
at Holmesburg, Pennsylvania. A diagnosis of "anti-social personality
with psychosis in remission" was changed to "aggressive personality
149A significantly larger number of files contain no mention of a "staff" having
been held between the time of commitment and about 1963 or 1964. This may indicate
a change of policy in favor of more frequent review. The staff of Farview is markedly
more aware and cautious of their patients' legal rights than they were 5 years ago.
Interviews with Dr. Moran, supra note 2, & Dr. Willis, supra note 37.
15o Interview with Dr. John Moran, supra note 2.
151 Interview with Isaac Pepp, Defender's Association of Philadelphia, in
Philadelphia, Pa., Feb. 6, 1969.
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(explosive personality) with incipient schizophrenia" in order to stress
that the patient is not a sociopath, but that he is subject to violent
outbursts and is on the verge of a psychotic breakdown.
The presenting physician asked the patient what crime he was
charged with and asked questions about the nature of the proceedings.
On the basis of the answers to these questions, as well as the patient's
high intelligence, responsiveness and ability to give coherent, relevant
answers to all the physician's questions, the staff decided that the
defendant understood the nature of the proceedings and could assist his
attorney in his defense. But then one physician expressed doubt
whether it would be wise to return the patient for trial; he stressed that
the patient needed treatment and would be unlikely to receive it in
jail. Another pointed out that he had resisted treatment at Farview, so
that availability of treatment might be irrelevant. It was suggested
that he be kept at Farview for six months, then re-evaluated. A
physician replied that treatment would be a long-term proposition in
any event and that it might be easier if the charges were disposed
of first. He hesitated to act on any assumption that the patient's con-
dition would improve by the end of six months. Discussion continued,
and it was the consensus of the staff that the patient was on the verge
of a psychotic explosion and the stress of trial might be too great for
him. It is not uncommon for the staff to decide that a patient is com-
petent to stand trial in the legal sense yet unable to stand the stress
of trial. 52
Independent psychiatrists who challenge the staff evaluation by
examining patients infrequently disagree with the opinion of the Far-
view staff. If there is disagreement, Farview suggests to the patient
that he take the matter to court for a hearing." Frequently a judge
will be unwilling to accept the view that a patient may be competent to
stand trial, yet still be seriously mentally ill."
Another problem frequently encountered is that due to court
delay, a patient returned to Philadelphia to stand trial may be detained
among the general Philadelphia prison population for a long period
of time. Since the weakened or defective ego of a mentally ill patient
lacks flexibility or adaptability, any change in his environment will
cause stress and anxiety in the patient. His anxiety is heightened when
the new environment is more hostile than the milieu found in the
mental hospital. When this is accompanied by the mounting anxiety
experienced by the patient as the date of his trial approaches, the re-
sulting stress may be too much for him." The Public Defender
152 Interview with Dr. Bernard J. Willis, supra note 37.
153 Interview -with Dr. John Moran, supra note 2.
154 Interviews with Dr. John Moran, supra note 2, Dr. Bernard J. Willis, supra
note 37, & Mr. Isaac Pepp, supra note 151.
155 Interviews with Drs. Edward B. Guy, C. Fred Herring, & Bernard J. Willis,
supra note 37.
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Association of Philadelphia has instituted a program which alleviates
many of these problems. If, during the Public Defender's visits to
Farview, he notices any indication in the files that any patient repre-
sented by the Defender Association has improved, he requests a
formal evaluation of competency to stand trial. If the resulting "staff"
discloses that the patient is competent, his case is docketed on the
trial list. The Public Defender then consults the District Attorney to
insure that he is ready to go to trial. The Defender also alerts a
psychiatrist at the Maximum Security Diagnostic and Classification
Center at Holmesburg that a patient from Farview will be arriving for
trial and reserves a room in the psychiatric ward. He also requests the
doctor to notify him personally upon the patient's return to Philadel-
phia. Only after all the requisite preparations are made does the
Defender request the Farview staff to transfer the patient to Phila-
delphia."55 If such a procedure were institutionalized, most of the prob-
lems in returning the prisoner for trial would be eliminated.
Another obstacle toward having patients considered competent to
stand trial is the de facto policy which appears to exist at Farview under
which a mentally ill patient is returned to trial unless he appears to be
unable to cope with the stress of trial. 57 The doctors are concerned
about both the dangerousness of a patient and the probability that if he
is tried and sentenced to jail, he may receive no treatment. Still, a
number of cases have been sent to Philadelphia courts for trial, wherein
the defendant was mentally ill and in need of hospitalization yet he met
the common law standard of competency. In one case,' 58 a patient who
was returned to court for trial was a paranoid schizophrenic with
organic brain damage. His condition was incurable by today's medical
knowledge and techniques. The defendant was extremely dangerous
and, in the opinion of the Farview staff, should not be allowed on
the street. He stood accused of several counts of murder and several
more of burglary. The Farview staff submitted three petitions to the
court: one certifying the patient was competent to stand trial, the
second a pre-sentence report recommending strongly that the defendant
be sentenced to Farview, and the third a petition for civil commitment
to Farview in case the defendant was acquitted. The disposition of this
case solves the problems presented when the treatment is hindered by
pending charges, guarantees the defendant's right to a speedy public
trial, and is administratively efficient.
A study of the disposition of cases returned to court from Farview
which was conducted in 1960 '" shows a high percentage of patients
freed by the court:
156 Interview with Mr. Isaac Pepp, supra note 151.
157 Text accompanying note 152 supra.
158 Survey, mipra note 55.
151 Note, Hospitalization of Mentally Ill Criminals, supra note 1, at 103; cf. Vann,
supra note 36, at 32; Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 7, at 460 & n.3.
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TABLE II
Assault
All Homi- Sex & Burglary Other
Cases cdde Crimes Battery etc. Arson Offenses
Disposition (N=146) (N=16) (=39) (N=23) (N=37) (N=13) (N=18)
No Indictment 1.4% - 2.6% - - 7.7% -
Nolle Prosequi 23.3% 37.5% 12.8% 34.8% 18.9% 23.1% 27.8%
Acquittal 4.8% 18.8% 2.6% 4.3% - - 11.1%
Probation 32.2% 18.8% 48.7% 21.7% 27.0% 61.5% 11.1%
Suspended
Sentence 15.1% - 7.7% 26.1% 29.7% - 11.1%
Total Freed 76.7% 75.0% 74.5% 87.0% 75.7% 92.3% 61.1%
Sentenced to
Prison A 20.6% 18.8% 23.1% 13.0% 24.3% 7.7% 27.8%
Committed
to Another
Hospital 2.7% 6.4% 2.6% - - - 11.1%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
A This figure represents 30 cases. In 7 of them, the face of the record, either
by explicit statement of the judge or by the backdating of the sentence to the time
of commitment, shows that time spent at Farview before trial was taken into account
in sentencing.
A number of reasons may be given for the high rate of release: 16 the
judge may think that the defendant has already served enough time for
his crime, or he may believe that the rehabilitative function of the crimi-
nal law has already been served, and nothing is to be gained by further
incarceration. Possibly, a judge may decide that rehabilitation can best
be accomplished by release under the supervision of the probation
department or parole board. These reasons are appropriate and equita-
ble if the release standard is total rehabilitation rather than competency
to stand trial. However, these reasons become invalid if a person is
brought to trial who still remains mentally ill, dangerous, and in need
of treatment. In these cases, disposition of the charges should be fol-
lowed by a treatment plan recommended by psychiatrists. Commitment
back to Farview may not always be advisable, but the judge must
consider the possibility that the defendant may remain mentally ill.
On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that in every case where a
person is returned to court as competent he is still mentally ill and
commitable. Therefore, a separate evaluation of the defendant's current
mental status, either by the institution of commitment procedures or by
a pre-sentence evaluation, is advisable in all cases in which a defendant
was found to be incompetent at one point before trial.
Finally, should the defendant be convicted and sentenced, he is
entitled to credit for the time accumulated since his original commit-
160 See Vann, supra note 36, at 31-33; Note, Hospitalization of Mentally Ill
Criminals, .spra note 1, at 104.
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ment to Farview. In Commonwealth v. iones,'6 ' the lower court denied
the defendant credit for the time he had spent at Embreeville State
Hospital, where he had been committed before he entered a plea of
guilty. The court reached this result by drawing a negative implica-
tion from the fact that section 348 of the Mental Health Act of 1951 162
and section 411 (c) (1) of the Mental Health & Mental Retardation Act
of 1966 ' expressly grant credit for time served at Farview after the
patient has been sentenced. The superior court reversed and granted
credit to the defendant for the time he spent in the hospital. The
Jones court noted that the Pennsylvania statute which grants credit
for time spent in custody before trial provides:
Any person who has been convicted of an offense . . .
and sentenced to a term of imprisonment shall be given credit
toward the service of his sentence for any days spent in
custody on this offense prior to the imposition of his sen-
tence .... 164
The court construed the words "in custody" to include detention in a
mental hospital and thus was able to extend the statute to Jones
himself. 15
VII. THE UNTREATABLE PATIENT AND THE PATIENT
REQUIRING LONG-TERM TREATMENT
The thorniest problem in the area of competency to stand trial is
that of the prisoner who is untreatable or who will require long-term
treatment before attaining competency. A great many competency
cases involve this exact situation. If the patient is untreatable, the
justification for his detention-to render him competent to stand
trial--cannot exist since he can never be rendered-competent.,'6  Pend-
ing charges hamper the patient's ability to face reality and gain insight
into the nature of his problem. They also restrict the flexibility and
number of treatment plans available to the attending psychiatrist.,
7
101211 Pa. Super. 366, 236 A2d 834 (1967); accord, Commonwealth ex rel.
Spanos v. Keenan, 102 Pitts. Legal J. 159 (Allegheny County Ct.), aff'd, 176 Pa.
Super. 245, 107 A.2d 593 (1954) ; Commonwealth v. Wright, 97 Pitts. Legal J. 301
(Allegheny County Ct. 1948).
162No. 429, [1963] Pa. Laws 896, amending No. 581, [1952] Pa. Laws 2067
(repealed effective July 1, 1969).
163 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4411(c) (1) (Supp. 1969).
16 4 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 898 (1964). This provision applies to sentences
imposed prior to the date of enactment. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83, 103,
233 A.2d 530, 541 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 983 (1968).
165 Accord, Commonwealth v. Martin, 213 Pa. Super. 754, 247 A.2d 664 (1968).
16 Cf. United States v. Klein, 325 F2d 283 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Miller v. Overholser,
206 F2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
1't See note 37 supra & accompanying text.
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Further, continued incarceration represents an indeterminate sen-
tence which may run far in excess of the sentence prescribed for the
crime with which the patient is charged. The fear that a supposedly
humane commitment procedure might lead to the indefinite and lengthy
incarceration of an allegedly untreatable defendant who would otherwise
be subject to a short, fixed penal sentence was a factor in the recent
Supreme Court decision of Powell v. Texas."G  The Court held that
it was not cruel and unusual punishment to subject a chronic alcoholic
to criminal sanctions. It was decided that he was being punished not
for his status, but for being drunk in public on a particular occasion. 189
In a plurality opinion, Mr. Justice Marshall stated:
Thus we run the grave risk that nothing will be accom-
plished beyond the hanging of a new sign-reading "hos-
pital"-over one wing of the jailhouse.
One virtue of the criminal process is, at least, that the
duration of penal incarceration typically has some outside
statutory limit . . . . "Therapeutic civil commitment" lacks
this feature; one is typically committed until one is "cured."
Thus, to do otherwise than affirm might subject indigent alco-
holics to the risk that they may be locked up for an indefinite
period of time under the same conditions as before, with no
more hope than before of receiving effective treatment and no
prospect of periodic "freedom." '
This reasoning applies equally to an incompetency commitment to Far-
view of an untreatable prisoner in lieu of possible conviction and im-
prisonment. The individual who is committed as incompetent with
criminal charges hanging, like the sword of Damocles, over his head
and who will not respond to other than long-term treatment may never
be restored to competence due to the antitherapeutic effects of the
charges.Y7- Yet, he cannot be brought to trial without violating his
right to a fair trial." 2 At first glance it seems that the interests of
the criminal law in trying the alleged offender and of the state's police
power in restoring the defendant to mental health are irreconcilable
in the case of the untreatable incompetent and the incompetent
requiring long-term treatment. Yet this conflict is readily resolved
when the purposes of the two conflicting powers are examined.
168 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
169 Id. at 532. But see Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir.
1966), -where the statute authorized the courts to take judicial notice "that a chronic
alcoholic is a sick person." Id. at 51.
170 392 U.S. at 529 (footnotes omitted).
171 Note 37 supra & accompanying text.
172 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 385 (1966).
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The interest of the criminal law in committing an incompetent is to
restore him to competence in order that he may face the charges brought
against him. T'S However, once the period of commitment exceeds the
statutory maximum period of imprisonment, the essential purpose of the
commitment for incompetency has been frustrated; the state, even if it
succeeds in convicting the defendant, cannot imprison him if he is al-
lowed credit for the time he spent in the hospital.174 At this point, the
state's interest in curing the patient should take precedence, and the
criminal charges should be dropped. This would allow more effective
treatment in hospitals which have less of a detrimental, penal atmosphere
than Farview. Under sections 410-12 of the Act of 1966,'5 commit-
ment of a person convicted of a crime ceases when his maximum sen-
tence expires, but he may be recommitted under civil proceedings.
Similar protection should be extended to one committed as incompetent
to stand trial in order to offset the harmful effects on treatment caused
by pending criminal charges.
The continued retention beyond the maximum sentence of the
untreatable patient or patient requiring long-term treatment under a
section 407 or section 408 1 "competency" commitment, rather than a
civil commitment, is a class discrimination which has no rational justi-
fication. Certainly continued incarceration beyond the maximum which
criminal sanctions would allow is a discrimination vis-i.-vis persons
convicted of crimes who are released from detention upon expiration
of the maximum sentence.
177
The disposition of those cases in which a patient is untreatable or
will require long-term treatment may be much more effectively accom-
plished on the administrative level than on a case-by-case basis. In
this area, the prosecutorial nolle prosequi is of crucial importance. Yet
there does not appear to be a standard administrative procedure in the
office of the Philadelphia District Attorney; rather, cases are disposed
of on an ad hoc basis as the possibility of a nolle prosequi is raised by
the Farview staff, the Court Clinic, or someone else outside the office
of the district attorney. This lack of initiative by the district attorney's
office is partly responsible for the fact that as many as thirty-two per
cent of the persons from Philadelphia currently committed to Farview
173 See note 121 supra & accompanying text.
174 Commonwealth v. Jones, 211 Pa. Super. 366, 236 A.2d 834 (1967); see
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956), where the Supreme Court author-
ized continued commitment for incompetency in the face of unlikelihood of recovery
by the patient so long as the "federal authority to prosecute" had not "been irretriev-
ably frustrated"; id. at 375; Sturdevant v. Settle, 192 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Mo. 1961),
where the court, quoting Greenwood with approval, held that since the petitioner had
been committed for a period in excess of the statutory maximum sentence, the "'federal
authority to prosecute has now been irretrievably frustrated.' [citation omitted]"; id. at
542. See also Foote, supra note 121, at 835-41.
1
7 5 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4410-12 (Supp. 1969). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 4243
(1969).
-
70 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4407, § 4408 (Supp. 1969).
77 Id. §§ 4410-12.
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as incompetent to stand trial have been incarcerated longer than they
would have been had they received maximum sentences for their alleged
crimes." In such a case the charges against the patient should be dis-
missed automatically. The existence of the charges hampers treatment;
and even if treatment is not possible, dropping the charges would permit
transfer of the patient to a more pleasant institution or one nearer his
family, if and when the Farview staff determines that this would be
advisable. Civil recommitment to Farview would provide security in
the case of a dangerous patient, yet because the commitment is now
civil the hospital would have a freer hand in offering the patient mean-
ingful treatment.'79
VIII. CONCLUSION
The appropriate governmental officials in Pennsylvania must
begin to make objective reassessment of commitment procedures. The
state legislature should evaluate its recent enactment with knowledge
of the stark reality of Farview, rather than the illusion of rehabilitative
therapy that the hospital is supposed to offer. Furthermore, the state
courts should consider seriously the real nature of the institution to
which they commit sick persons. To view that institution as anything
less than penal and antitherapeutic is egregious error.
These same officials must also make an even more fundamental
reform of the state's entire rehabilitation apparatus. Farview is a sym-
bol of public neglect, and an eyesore to our Constitutional heritage.
It is a situation in desperate need of correction-and that relief must
come quickly.
178 See text & table accompanying notes 8-10 spra.
179 See note 37 supra.
